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The Western financial sanctions are an important factor affecting the deteriorating economic 
situation in Russia. Nevertheless, they are not the deciding factor. They have significantly 
undermined the opportunities which Russian companies have to attract foreign capital, thus 
contributing to the deterioration of their financial condition (which is particularly prominent 
in the case of energy firms subject to sanctions). Therefore, Russian businesses need more 
support from the state. However, this support is becoming more difficult due to the dramatic 
fall in oil prices – revenues from oil exports are the main source of budget revenue.
As a consequence of the sanctions, capital outflow has accelerated and the influx of foreign 
investments to Russia has fallen back; this means that it is less likely that Russia will move out 
of recession and that economic development will occur. Obstructed access to capital may de-
lay, and in some cases even prevent, the implementation of important energy infrastructure 
projects. One indirect consequence of the Western financial sanctions is Moscow’s increased 
openness to participation in the Russian upstream sector of foreign investors from other 
directions than the West (mainly from China and India). 
The Western economic sanctions  
on Russia
In July 2014, the European Union and the United 
States imposed so-called ‘sectoral sanctions’ on 
Russia in response to its aggression on Ukraine. 
The sanctions were renewed in June 2015 and 
then in December 2015. They will be in effect at 
least until the end of July 2016, and their lifting 
is dependent above all on the implementation 
of the Minsk agreements concerning Donbas. 
The sanctions limit the possibility of financing 
selected organisations from the Russian ban-
king, energy and military sectors, and also of 
technological co-operation with them. At that 
time access to the EU’s capital markets was re-
stricted (a ban on receiving loans with maturi-
ty date longer than 30 days was put in place) 
for Russia’s five largest state-controlled banks 
(Sberbank, Vneshtorgbank, Gazprombank, Ros-
selkhozbank and Vnesheconombank), the three 
largest companies in the Russian arms sector 
(Uralvagonzavod, Oboronprom and the United 
Aircraft Corporation) and the energy sector (Ro-
sneft, Transneft and Gazpromneft). Analogous 
sanctions were additionally imposed by the US 
on the state-owned Bank of Moscow and banks 
controlled by the oligarchs who have close links 
with the Kremlin (Bank Rossiya and SMP Bank) 
as well as the companies Rostechnologii, Gaz-
promneft and Transneft. The USA also decided 
to freeze the assets of state-owned companies 
in the Russian arms sector (including those of 
Almaz-Antey corporation). Furthermore, it is 
forbidden under EU law to supply equipment, 
technologies and services to Russia in the area 
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of the exploration and operation of deepwa-
ter1, Arctic and shale oil deposits. The USA 
imposed analogous sanctions on Rosneft, Ga-
zpromneft, Transneft, Gazprom, LUKoil, No-
vatek and Surgutneftegaz. In addition to this, 
a ban on importing and exporting arms and 
military equipment to and from Russia and 
on supplying dual-use goods and technolo-
gies that could be used for military purposes 
was introduced. This ban covered Almaz-Antey 
and Kalashnikov among other corporations. 
Financial sanctions have had the strongest 
direct impact on the Russian economy from 
among all the aforementioned sanctions (the 
impact of the technological sanctions is long-
term and possible to assess only in the longer 
term). The sanctions have to the greatest extent 
affected the entities on the US SDN list (Special-
ly Designated Nationals List) which includes, for 
example, the banks of the oligarchs on whom 
personal sanctions have been imposed – Bank 
Rossiya and SMP Bank. These entities were for-
ced to withdraw from Western markets since 
they were unable to effect any cross-border 
transactions with Western contractors, and the-
ir assets in the United States had been frozen2. 
All other entities on the sanction list (such as 
Russian state-owned banks) can formally carry 
out any financial transactions in the West, with 
the exception of loan liabilities excluded due to 
the sanctions3. 
1 According to US standards, these are depths exceeding 
152 m, and according to EU standards – 400 m. 
2 http://www.interfax.ru/business/428359
3 In February 2016 the US government de facto broad-
ened the scope of sanctions with an informal one: it 
warned  US banks to be cautious about participating 
in the distribution of Russian state bonds, since these 
could be used as a channel for indirect financing of the 
entities on the sanctions list. A similar recommendation 
addressed to European banks was included in unofficial 
statements of representatives of the European Union’s 
institutions in March 2016. Foreign loans are  one of 
the planned ways of financing Russia’s budget deficit 




The impact of the financial sanctions 
on the condition of the Russian economy
The Western financial sanctions, although 
formally targeted against selected entities, 
have affected the Russian economy as a who-
le. However, it is difficult to estimate the-
ir consequences precisely. On the one hand, 
the calculations must take into account the 
range of the informal effect of the sanctions 
extending far beyond the precise restrictions. 
This is manifested through both falling con-
fidence in Russian capital and co-operation 
with Russia (and this increases the costs of 
attracting foreign capital by Russian banks 
and firms, since these are perceived as high
-risk transactions) and purely technical pro-
blems resulting from the fact that Western 
contractors have introduced meticulous con-
trol procedures for cash flows in cases when 
Russian entities are involved4. On the other 
hand, the sanctions coincided with other ne-
gative phenomena in the Russian economy, 
such as: structural problems which have been 
building up for years due to the dysfunctional 
development model based on the raw mate-
rials sector, the poor investment climate ad-
ditionally weakened by tension in relations 
between Russia and the West caused by the 
Ukrainian crisis, and – last but not least – the 
4 These are aimed at verifying whether a given entity is 
on the sanctions list or whether a given transaction is 
indirectly linked to an entity on the sanctions list. There 
is no doubt that the vast damages (almost US$9 billion) 
that BNP Paribas had to pay in 2014 to the United States 
for violating the US sanction regime concerning Cuba, 
Iran and Sudan in 2004-2012 has affected the stance of 
Western banks. 
The sanctions coincided with other neg-
ative phenomena in the Russian econo-
my, such as structural problems and the 
fall in the price of oil.
3OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 203
dramatic fall of oil prices in the second half 
of 2014 and in 2015 (from US$115 to around 
US$30). The impact the latter has had on the 
condition of the Russian economy has been 
many times stronger than that of the finan-
cial sanctions, especially in the medium term5. 
Determining the short-, medium- and long-
term effects of the sanctions is difficult. In the 
autumn of 2014, the minister for the economy, 
Alexey Ulyukaev, assessed that the  immediate 
costs of financial sanctions had reached around 
US$90 billion, i.e. around 4.8% of GDP in 20146, 
pointing out that this was precisely the amount 
Russian entities would have to obtain from the 
domestic market to refinance their foreign de-
bts7. At the same time, the minister of finance, 
Anton Siluanov, estimated that the annual costs 
of the sanctions were around US$40 billion, ar-
guing that the falling oil prices had affected the 
Russian economy most of all (losses reaching 
between US$90 and 100 billion)8. The Central 
Bank in its survey developed in August 2015 
also assessed that the impact of the financial 
sanctions was much lower than that of the situ-
ation on the oil market: estimating that the joint 
effect of the sanctions and the falling oil prices 
between mid 2014 and mid 2016 would be be-
tween 4.2 and 4.8% of GDP, while the effect of 
5 For more see: E. Гурвич, И. Прилепский, Влияние финан-
совых санкций на российскую экономику, Вопросы эко-
номики, № 1, 2016.
6 Russia’s GDP in 2014 stood at 71.4 trillion roubles, i.e. 
US$1,860.6 billion, the average exchange rate being 38.4 
RUB/US$; http://www.tradingeconomics.com/russia/gdp
7 Риски открытые и закрытые, 9 October 2014, http://
www.rg.ru/2014/10/09/ubytki-ot-sankcii.html 0
8 Силуанов оценил потери России от санкций и де-
шевеющей нефти в $140 млрд, 24 November 2014, 
http://www.rbc.ru/finances/24/11/2014/5472ededcb-
b20f50f1970522
the sanctions alone would be 1.0–1.2% of GDP9. 
The restricted opportunities for attracting fo-
reign capital, including loan refinancing, which 
adversely affects the current financial condition 
and investment strategies of Russian entities, 
have been the most painful consequence of the 
sanctions for Russia (the sanctions have above 
all affected the banking sector where state-ow-
ned entities covered by the sanctions predomi-
nate). Contrary to the Russian government’s 
declarations, the possibilities of obtaining ca-
pital from sources outside the system of We-
stern financial institutions remain limited. The 
reasons for this lay in traditional restrictions on 
the Asian markets, which include their lack of 
experience in co-operation with Russia, as well 
as comparative disadvantages when compared 
to the West, such as the much smaller scale of 
the regional financial markets, their  hermetic 
nature  and higher capital costs. Another dif-
ficulty is  the fact that Asian banks take care 
to observe the Western sanctions on Russia, 
this being an effect of the globalisation of the 
financial flows10. However, the consequences 
of the sanctions have been partly alleviated as 
a result of anti-crisis measures taken by the go-
vernment in December 2014 involving extensi-
ve support from the Central Bank and the state 
budget to maintain banks’ foreign currency and 
rouble liquidity, and assistance to state-owned 
companies. 
The level of foreign debt refinancing present 
both in banks and the real sector has fallen to a 
significant extent since the third quarter of 2014 
as a result of the sanctions: between mid 2014 
and mid 2015, banks refinanced around 23% 
of their debts on average and the real sector 
did so to 84% (while the influx of capital to the 
banking and real sectors between the second 
9 Динамика потенциального ВВП России послe нефтя-
ного шока: роль сильного изменения  относительных 
цен и структурных жесткостей, Серия докладов об 
экономических исследованиях № 6, август 2015. 
10 ВТБ: сотрудничество банков России и Китая осложне-
но санкциями Запада, 5 September 2015, http://ria.ru/
economy/20150905/1230524799.html
The restricted opportunities for attracting 
foreign capital has been the most painful 
consequence of the financial sanctions.
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and the fourth quarters of 2013 satisfied the 
refinancing needs in excess; its level reaching 
120%)11. Both of these sectors have resorted to 
selling foreign assets to get the funds necessa-
ry to repay their debts. It is possible to take an 
example from the third quarter of 2014, which 
was the most difficult for these sectors – in this 
quarter the banking sector reduced its foreign 
assets by almost US$30 billion. The same trend 
was also observed in the real sector12.
The impact of the financial sanctions on servi-
cing foreign debt is gradually diminishing. 
Throughout 2015, Russian entities were buil-
ding their currency ‘cushion’, reducing invest-
ment expenses, implementing austerity policies 
and continued to sell off their foreign assets. 
All this enabled them to repay a significant 
part of their foreign debt while being subject 
to formal and informal sanctions13. The scale of 
debt repayment is also easing off: it reached 
around US$24 billion in December 2015 against 
US$33 billion a year before14, while the estima-
ted real amounts to be repaid in 2016 will range 
only between US$50 and 55 billion (taking into 
account the expectations that the intra-corpo-
rate part of the debt will be refinanced). Howe-
ver, Russia’s ‘safety margin’ in this area may be 
reduced if oil prices continue to fall. 
11 Е. Гурвич, И. Прилепский, op. cit. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Throughout 2015, foreign debt was reduced from 
US$171.5 billion to US$132.3 billion in the banking 
sector, and from US$375.4 billion to US$340.6 bil-
lion in the real sector. http://www.banki.ru/news/len-
ta/?id=8598912 
14 Data from the Central Bank of Russia. Since 2014, Rus-
sia’s foreign debt has been reduced from US$729 billion 
to around US$522 billion.
Another noticeable consequence of the finan-
cial sanctions was the  significant escalation of 
capital outflow in 2014 (over US$151 billion, the 
largest in the Russian Federation’s history). Ho-
wever, this phenomenon per se is nothing new 
for Russia (capital outflows have been seen 
every year so far, with the exception of 2007). 
What the sanctions did is contribute to inten-
sifying the dynamics of capital outflow in the 
third and fourth quarters of 2014 due to the ac-
cumulation of foreign debt repayment15. At the 
same time, capital flows were strongly affected 
in the same period by falling oil prices and the 
related deterioration of Russia’s image as an 
investing market. However, the situation stabi-
lised in 2015; annual capital outflow reached 
only US$56.9 billion and was predominantly 
the result of foreign debt repayment. The es-
timated net effect of the sanctions in respect 
of capital outflow between mid 2014 and mid 
2015 is US$72 billion16.
The financial sanctions, including their informal 
aspect, were most likely the main reason be-
hind the rapid setback in the inflow of portfo-
lio investments and foreign direct investments 
(FDI) to the Russian real sector in the third qu-
arter of 2014 (the FDI at that time reached only 
US$1 billion, while in the first and second qu-
arters their total value was around US$20 bil-
lion)17. However, this trend was nothing new: 
the FDI influx to Russia had been continuously 
contracting in the preceding years above all 
due to the economic slowdown and the poor 
investment climate. The sanctions did not, then, 
initiate, but rather accelerated this process. This 
trend continued in 2015 as well, when the FDI 
fell 92% year-on-year, the main reason for this 
being the Russian recession, and other reasons 
included investors withdrawing from emerging 
markets. 
15 Отток капитала из России в 2014 году вырос за год почти 
в 2,5 раза, 17 January2015, http://www.bbc.com/russian/
rolling_news/2015/01/150117_russia_capital_flight
16 Е. Гурвич, И. Прилепский, op. cit.
17	Инвесторы	выжидают, 10 October 2014, http://expert.
ru/2014/10/10/investoryi-vyizhidayut/
The consequences of the sanctions are 
a heavy burden for the Russian budget, 
and they adversely affect the chances of 
economic growth in Russia, which are al-
ready slight.
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In the longer term, the negative impact of the 
financial sanctions will be manifested in two 
ways. On the one hand, it will mean that the 
Russian budget will be heavily burdened due 
to the need to support the ineffective banks 
and state-owned companies facing the con-
sequences of the economic recession (in 2015, 
GDP fell by 3.7%) unable to attract capital from 
external sources (aid from public funds to the 
banking sector alone between the end of 2014 
and November 2015 reached around 2.4% of 
GDP). Furthermore, this support is becoming 
more and more problematic, given the falling 
revenue caused by the falling price of Urals 
oil – in January 2016 it was below US$30/bbl.
On the other hand, upholding sanctions in the 
longer term will adversely affect the chances 
of economic growth in Russia, which are sli-
ght even without the sanctions. Forced debt 
repayment (instead of refinancing) combined 
with the structural economic recession, the oil 
price slump and the devaluation of the rouble 
will most likely bring about a massive withdra-
wal from investments by Russian entities, which 
will have to focus on solving current problems 
with debt repayment instead. The shrinking do-
mestic investment sources will most likely not 
be relieved by foreign investors since they have 
been discouraged by Russia’s poor macroeco-
nomic results and low investment rating.
What will have a major impact on Russia’s fur-
ther functioning in the sanction regime  is  the 
dynamics of the informal effect of the sanc-
tions which became noticeably weaker in 2015. 
Proof of an evolution of sentiments, despite 
continuing scepticism about direct investing in 
Russia, may be observed both in the demand 
for the Eurobonds issued in October by Gaz-
prom and Norilsk Nickel18 and the increasingly 
clear expectation from Western business circ-
les (and some European governments) that the 
sanctions should be alleviated. 
The impact of the financial sanctions 
on the Russian energy sector
Even though the main external factor that 
adversely affects the condition of the Russian 
energy sector is the dramatic oil price slump 
seen over the past few years, the financial sanc-
tions19 turned out to be an important additio-
nal element.
The financial sanctions have restricted access to 
Western capital for Russian energy companies. 
This has adversely affected both their budgeta-
ry condition and the opportunities they have to 
implement infrastructural projects. 
Rosneft was the first to announce the need to 
modify its investment budget – it did so already 
in July 2014; and in March 2015 it was announ-
ced that its expenses on investments would be 
reduced by as much as 30% (from US$14 billion 
in 2014 to US$9.8 billion in 2015). Novatek, Rus-
sia’s largest so-called ‘independent gas produ-
cer’, also announced that its investment plans 
would be modified in March 2015; its budget 
for 2015 was reduced by 21% against 2014 
(63.17 billion roubles in 2014; 50 billion roub-
les in 2015). LUKoil also reduced its investment 
18 European and US investors were strongly interested 
in the Eurobonds denominated in US$ and euros. 
«Газпром» впервые с 2014 года разместит еврообли-
гации на €1 млрд, 8 October 2015. 
19 Along with the financial sanctions, so-called ‘technolog-
ical sanctions’, covering the exploration and operation 
of deepwater, Arctic and shale oil deposits, have had 
a strong impact on Russian energy firms. One direct 
consequence of these sanctions was the suspension of 
co-operation between Western and Russian companies 
on many oil and gas production projects, such as halting 
the sea-shelf projects implemented by Rosneft in collab-
oration with the US corporation Exxon Mobil, Norway’s 
Statoil and Italy’s Eni; withholding LUKoil and France’s 
Total’s joint upstream projects in Western Siberia and 
the imposition of US sanctions on the Yuzhno-Kirinskoye 
field in Sakhalin (this field was expected to become the 
source of the natural gas to be exported from the LNG 
terminal Sakhalin-2, which is planned for development). 
The most serious problem for energy 
firms are not financial sanctions but low 
oil prices.
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budget from US$14 billion in 2014 to US$12.5 
billion in 2015; the budget is expected to be 
further reduced in 2016.
Restricted access to foreign capital has had 
a particularly strong negative impact on the 
financial condition of Rosneft, mainly due to 
the service and repayment of its debt resul-
ting from the takeover of TNK-BP in 201320. 
One illustration of the limited opportunities 
to attract capital is the fact that Rosneft requ-
ested the Russian government to provide finan-
cial support worth 1.5 trillion roubles from the 
National Welfare Fund already in August 2014 
(an equivalent of around US$45 billion at that 
time; this was more than a half of the fund’s 
money); in October 2014, it increased the requ-
ested amount to 2 trillion roubles21. Further-
more, in May 2015, Rosneft announced that it 
was planning to take a total loan of 10 trillion 
roubles from Russian banks: 3.69 trillion roub-
les from VTB, 3 trillion roubles from the Russian 
Regional Development Bank and 3.2 trillion ro-
ubles from Gazprombank22. 
Restricted access to capital may delay, and in 
some cases even prevent, the implementation 
of major Russian infrastructural projects, ma-
inly in the LNG sector. One example is Yamal- 
-LNG, Russia’s most promising project in the 
area of liquefied natural gas production. The 
20 Rosneft repaid around US$9.4 billion in December 2014 
and US$7 billion in February 2015. The schedule for 
repayment of Rosneft’s remaining debt is as follows: 
US$10.9 billion already in 2015, US$15.1 billion in 2016, 
US$11.1 billion in 2017 and US$5.7 billion in 2018. The 
total debt as per end of June was US$42.1 billion. 
21 «Роснефть» просит из ФНБ более 2 трлн рублей – Си-
луанов, http://www.vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2014/ 
10/22/rosneft-prosit-iz-fnb-bolee-2-trln-rub-siluanov
22 «Роснефть» попросила разрешить ей занять почти 10 
трлн руб, http://www.rbc.ru/economics/18/05/2015/55
5a15119a79479ee16e1300 
project envisages the construction of a liqu-
efaction plant that will have a total production 
capacity of 16.5 million tonnes (the equivalent 
of around 22.6 billion m3) and is being imple-
mented jointly by Russia’s Novatek (which has a 
51.1% stake in the project), China’s CNPC (20%), 
China’s Silk Road Fund (9.9%) and France’s Total 
(20%).  So-called ‘project financing’ was expec-
ted to cover 70% of the expenses of the project 
(the total cost of which is US$27 billion), but 
the participants of the project have so far been 
unable to enter into final loan agreements, even 
though they were expected to be signed in June 
2014. What turned out to be the main obstacle 
was the fact that financial sanctions were impo-
sed on Novatek and also on Gazprombank and 
Vnesheconombank23 – the Russian banks which 
were expected to take part in the financing of 
the project. The Yamal-LNG consortium only 
signed initial agreements with the China Deve-
lopment Bank Corporation (CDBC) and Vneshe-
conombank and Gazprombank on 20 May 2014 
in Shanghai, setting the terms of the project 
financing and another initial agreement with 
Chinese banks in April 2015 (the participants 
of the project expected that loans from Chine-
se and Russian banks would replace the funds 
initially expected from European banks). On 
15 March 2016, China’s Silk Road Fund bought 
a 9.9% stake in the Yamal-LNG project from 
Novatek24, but even this deal does not mean 
automatic loan support from Chinese banks – 
the Russian side has announced it will continue 
negotiations to this effect. As a consequence 
of the financial sanctions, Gazprom has postpo-
ned (in practice, given up) its plans to build LNG 
liquefaction plants in the Baltic Sea (the Baltic 
LNG project) and in the Far East (the Vladivo-
23 The USA and Canada imposed financial sanctions on 
Novatek; Gazprombank and Vnesheconombank were 
additionally covered by financial sanctions from the Eu-
ropean Union.
24 A preliminary agreement to this effect was signed at the 
time of the Vladivostok economic summit in September, and 
the final agreement was signed on 17 December 2015. The 
transaction cost was 1 billion euros, http://www.vedomo-
sti.ru/business/articles/2016/03/15/633666-novatek-yamal 
Obstructed access to capital may delay or 
even prevent the implementation of some 
infrastructure projects.
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stok LNG project). Gazprombank was expected 
to be the main creditor of these projects25. 
Problems with attracting capital may also cau-
se a significant delay and probably even with-
drawal from implementing costly infrastruc-
tural projects that have been pushed through 
by Rosneft and on which the USA and Canada 
have imposed financial sanctions. This in par-
ticular concerns the plans to build the Far East 
LNG liquefaction plant and Rosneft’s plans to 
build a large petrochemical complex in the Far 
East (the total estimated cost being US$40 bil-
lion); Minister Ulyukaev made it clear already 
in March 2015 that the latter project would 
not be given priority in the context of gran-
ting support from the National Welfare Fund. 
Even though the financial sanctions have not 
had an adverse effect on the levels of oil and 
gas production in Russia, their consequences 
may still be felt in the longer term. One direct 
result of Russian fears is Moscow’s increasing 
openness to foreign investments in the Russian 
upstream sector. In September 2014, President 
Vladimir Putin announced that Russia was re-
ady to offer Chinese firms shares in strategic 
oil and gas fields26; in turn, Arkady Dvorkovich, 
Russian deputy prime minister, added in March 
2015 that Russia was even ready to offer its Chi-
nese partners controlling stakes as part of joint 
oil production projects27. On 22 October 2015, 
during the Eurasian Forum in Verona, Rosneft’s 
25 Газпромбанк остался без СПГ, http://www.kommer-
sant.ru/doc/2906828 
26 The Russian president said that “there are no limitations for 
our Chinese friends” «Для китайских друзей ограничений 
нет», http://www.gazeta.ru/business/2014/09/01/6199073.
shtml 
27 Дворкович пообещал Китаю контроль над россий-
ской нефтью, http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/
articles/2015/03/01/neft-techet-v-kitai 
CEO, Igor Sechin, offered European firms a sha-
re in Russian projects worth a total of US$100 
billion28, without going into detail. In turn, in 
November 2015, he announced that an offer to 
invest in fields in the Far East and Yamal has 
also been offered to Japanese firms29. 
Although the Russian efforts have so far resul-
ted mostly in framework and initial agreements 
envisaging the participation of foreign firms 
(mainly Indian and Chinese) in oil and gas 
production projects in Russia, given the incre-
asingly difficult financial situation of Russian 
energy firms, it is more and more likely that 
these agreements will be finalised. The most 
advanced agreement to date is the one signed 
in September 2015 by Rosneft and India’s 
ONGC envisaging the sale of a 15% stake in the 
Russian company Vankorneft (the operator of 
one of Russia’s largest oil and gas fields) which 
is planned to be finalised in spring 2016. On 
March 16th Rosneft signed initial agreements 
with a consortium of Indian firms (Oil India, 
Indian Oil, Bharat PetroResources) envisaging 
the sale of a 29.9% stake in Srednebotuobin-
skoye field and the sale of a 23.9% stake in 
Vankorneft. In turn, Rosneft’s agreements 
with Chinese energy firms are still preliminary: 
the agreement on the sale of a 10% stake in 
Vankorneft signed in autumn 2014 with CNPC; 
the co-operation agreement with the Chinese 
petrochemical company Sinopec concerning 
the operation of Russian fields (envisaging that 
the Sinopec will buy a 49% stake in Rosneft’s 
Russkoye and Yurubcheno-Tokhomskoye fields 
in Eastern Siberia). 
The financial sanctions have had a marginal 
impact on the Russian oil trade and the Rus-
sian refining sector. Only Japanese trader firms 
in August 2014 withheld their participation in 
spot tenders (some banks which had credited 
28 «Роснефть» предлагает европейцам проекты на 
$100 млрд, http://www.vedomosti.ru/business/arti-
cles/2015/10/23/614022-rosneft-proekti 
29 «Роснефть» пригласила Японию к  участию в  своих 
проектах, http://pronedra.ru/oil/2015/11/06/rosnef-
ti-priglasila-yaponiyu-k-uchastiyu/ 
The limited access to Western capital may 
accelerate Indian and Chinese invest-
ments in the Russian upstream sector.
8OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 203
EDITORS: Adam Eberhardt, Marek Menkiszak 
Anna Łabuszewska, Katarzyna Kazimierska  
TRANSLATION: Ilona Duchnowicz
Co-operation: Nicholas Furnival 
DTP: Bohdan Wędrychowski
The views expressed by the authors of the papers do not 
necessarily reflect the opinion of Polish authorities
Centre for Eastern Studies
Koszykowa 6a, 00-564 Warsaw
phone: +48 | 22 | 525 80 00
e-mail: info@osw.waw.pl
Visit our website: www.osw.waw.pl
transactions covering oil supplies from Rosneft 
up until then started rejecting traders’ applica-
tions or disregarded them). Another consequ-
ence of the sanctions was that the Italian refi-
nery Saras gave up its plans to establish a joint 
venture with Rosneft that would have traded 
in oil and petroleum products30. The sanctions 
have not affected the plans to modernise Rus-
sian refineries. Gazpromneft is continuing mo-
dernisation work at the refinery in Moscow, 
Rosneft at the refinery in Tuapse, LUKoil at the 
refinery in Nizhny Novgorod, and Surgutnefte-
gaz in Kirishi. 
Conclusions
The Western financial sanctions are not the 
main source of the problems in the Russian 
economy, but they have significantly weakened 
Russia’s capability to neutralise the consequen-
ces of the crisis resulting above all from the oil 
price slump and the accumulation of structural 
problems in the economy. By increasing foreign 
debt, the Russian government could have found 
a simple way to deal with the consequences of 
the recession, which are increasingly being felt 
30 «Роснефть» и Saras отказались от создания СП «по поли-
тическим причинам», http://www.forbes.ru/news/287397 
-rosneft-i-saras-otkazalis-ot-sozdaniya-sp-po-politicheskim-
prichinam 
by the Russian public: the level of public debt 
is relatively low (the forecast for 2016 is 15.6% 
of GDP), and the possibility of accumulating 
additional funds, considering the increasing 
budget deficit gains special significance in the 
context of the upcoming parliamentary (2016) 
and presidential (2018) elections. 
In addition to the temporary consequences 
of the sanctions, which are possible to calcu-
late and which the government has been able 
to cope with to a great extent at the cost of 
significant budget expenditure and owing to 
measures taken by the Central Bank, the sanc-
tions have an indirect and long-term impact 
on the economy. It will most likely only be pos-
sible to assess the full scale of this impact in 
a few years’ time. Resources are shrinking due 
to the recession and are allocated mainly for 
debt repayment instead of on investments. Fur-
thermore, entrepreneurs are also unwilling to 
invest due to the uncertainty about how the 
political and economic situation will develop. 
However, it seems that the long-term econo-
mic growth perspectives are being undermined 
above all by the poor investment climate, the 
excessive presence of the state in the economy 
and the ineffectiveness of the present model of 
governance – and to a much smaller extent by 
the sanctions. 
